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INTRODUCTION 
he commercialization of outer space has been stunted by 
inefficiencies in the international laws regulating its use. 
International law classifies outer space as the common heritage 
of mankind.1 Under this regime, (1) neither outer space nor any 
celestial body is subject to national (and, under some interpre-
                                                                                                             
* J.D., The University of Chicago Law School; B.A., Albion College. I would 
like to thank Professor Tom Ginsburg at The University of Chicago Law 
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 1. E.g., Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies art. 11, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 
U.N.T.S. 21 [hereinafter Moon Treaty] (entered into force July 11, 1984); 
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. 
I, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 207–08 [hereinafter Outer 
Space Treaty] (“The exploration and use of outer space . . . shall be the prov-
ince of all mankind.”). 
T
2013] ECONOMIC INEFFICIENCIES OF SPACE LAW 525 
tations, private) appropriation,2 and (2) any use of outer space 
must be carried out for the benefit of all states “irrespective of 
their degree of economic or scientific development.”3 The partic-
ular quantity and type of “benefits” which must be shared are 
unclear. No state or private entity has been willing to bear the 
enormous cost of commercialization in part because interna-
tional law prohibits national and, potentially, private appropri-
ation, and even if the laws are interpreted to allow private ap-
propriation, they require private entities to share some unclear 
quantity of returns (“benefits”) with every state on Earth. In-
deed, the diversity of interpretation itself creates an uncertain-
ty that is prohibitive of meaningful investment. The tragedy, of 
course, is that we possess the technical capability to commer-
cialize outer space. 
While the precise profitability of the commercial use of outer 
space is unknown, space-faring states possess the capacity to 
develop commercial uses. They have abstained from doing so, 
at least in part, because international law has not provided 
them with the assurance that they will reap the full benefit of 
their efforts.4 For example, some potential commercial uses of 
outer space include mining, manufacturing, and energy genera-
tion. There is silicon on Mars and platinum on Near Earth As-
teroids (“NEAs”) and the Moon.5 A rare isotope of Helium, He-
lium-3, exists in abundance on Mars and the Moon.6 This iso-
tope can be used in proposed fusion reactors, which, using the 
Helium-3 on the Moon alone, could power the Earth for 500 
                                                                                                             
 2. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. II. 
 3. Id. art. I (emphasis added). 
 4. See David Collins, Efficient Allocation of Real Property Rights on the 
Planet Mars, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 201, 208 (2008) (“No country is likely 
to undertake the enormous risks, economic and otherwise, associated with 
Mars colonization without the legal certainty that their rewards will not be 
distributed to others.”). 
 5. Jeremy L. Zell, Note, Putting a Mine on the Moon: Creating an Interna-
tional Authority to Regulate Mining Rights in Outer Space, 15 MINN. J. INT’L 
L. 489, 490 (2006). 
 6. See Collins, supra note 4, at 203 (“It is already known that Mars pos-
sesses vast resources of frozen carbon dioxide from which the important fuels 
of oxygen, deuterium and helium-3 can be derived.”); Zell, supra note 5, at 
505 (“Helium-3 is a helium isotope that is rare on Earth but is believed to be 
abundant on the Moon.”). 
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years.7 Separately, technology is being developed to harness 
solar energy from the Sun’s rays in outer space and then 
transmit it to Earth.8 Outer space also presents the opportuni-
ty for zero gravity manufacturing, which would allow compa-
nies to manufacture “products in increased quantities and at 
greater levels of quality, all at a lower price than could be 
achieved on Earth.”9 
Additionally, there are contingent benefits to the commercial-
ization of outer space. Heart monitoring technologies were de-
veloped initially to monitor astronauts’ hearts during the Apol-
lo missions, and the need for more powerful and efficient com-
puter technologies initiated major developments at technology 
companies like IBM.10 These “positive externalities” are contin-
gent upon demand from programs like Apollo. While these uses 
only scratch the surface of those proposed, they illustrate the 
great potential that lies just out of reach, arguably obstructed 
by the collective inaction problem created by our international 
space laws. 
This Article will proceed in three Parts. Part I will discuss 
the anticommons problem: the development of space law, the 
current law, and other regimes that employ the common herit-
age of mankind principle. Part II will survey and analyze nine 
proposed property regimes for outer space that claim to resolve 
                                                                                                             
 7. See Yukihiro Tomita et al., Use of Polarized Helium-3 for the Energy 
Production, NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS & METHODS PHYSICS RES. 421, 424 (1998) 
(“The minable helium-3 on the lunar surface is estimated as about 106 tons, 
which corresponds to the amount of the energy demand in all of the world at 
the middle of the next century during 500 yr.”). 
 8. See generally George I. Seffers, Space-Based Solar Power Comes Closer 
to Reality, SIGNAL MAG. (Dec. 2010), 
http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=node/2461. 
 9. James J. Trimble, The International Law of Outer Space and its Effect 
on Commercial Space Activity, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 521, 524 (1983–1984). See 
also Leslie I. Tennen, Outer Space: A Preserve for All Humankind, 2 HOUS. J. 
INT’L L. 145, 147 (1979–1980); Martin Menter, The Impact of Treaties on 
Commercial Space Operations, 1 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 389, 390 
(1977–1978). See generally Manufacturing, SPACE ISLAND GROUP, 
http://www.spaceislandgroup.com/manufacturing.html (last visited Jan. 2, 
2013) (describing the benefits of producing products such as electronics and 
pharmaceuticals in zero gravity). 
 10. See CHRIS KRAFT, FLIGHT: MY LIFE IN MISSION CONTROL 192–93, 353–54 
(2001) (describing the domestic and international economic benefits of the 
Apollo space program). 
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this problem. Finally, Part III will propose a two-tier regime of 
first possession property rights wherein entities could, first, 
commercialize space, keep their returns, and be regulated to 
protect against inefficiencies, and, second, upon the satisfaction 
of certain requirements, obtain territorial sovereignty. 
I. A TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS 
A. Economic Inefficiencies Arising from the Regulation of 
Shared Resources 
A tragedy of the commons occurs when a shared resource is 
overexploited by the individuals who share it.11 This occurs be-
cause the cost of increasing individual activity is borne by the 
group as a whole, but the benefit of increased activity inures to 
the individual alone—so each individual will increase her activ-
ity knowing that she will only bear a fraction of the cost, result-
ing in overexploitation. The cost of each individual’s increased 
exploitation is an “externality”: “a cost (or benefit) of any given 
action that is not taken into consideration by the actor in de-
termining the level of that activity that is optimal from the ac-
tor’s point of view.”12 
The classic example of a tragedy of the commons is a plot of 
land on which multiple farmers graze cattle. Each farmer will, 
rationally, seek to maximize her gain. If one farmer chooses to 
introduce one extra animal to the plot, the benefit inures to her 
alone, but the cost in terms of space, waste, and consumption 
are borne by all of the farmers equally. Introducing one extra 
animal is an economically rational decision for the farmer to 
make because the personal benefit will outweigh the cost, so 
she will add the animal. Because each farmer seeks to maxim-
ize her own personal gain, each will make this individually ra-
tional economic decision and the plot will soon be overexploit-
ed.13 As Garrett Hardin put it, “[t]herein is the tragedy.”14 
The opposite, however, is also true. If a shared resource is ac-
cessible to a group, but any benefit taken by an individual must 
                                                                                                             
 11. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 
1243, 1243–48 (1968). 
 12. JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 364 (17th ed. 2006). 
 13. See Hardin, supra note 11, at 1244. 
 14. Id. 
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be shared equally among the group, the resource will be under-
exploited. For example, suppose that the plot of land from the 
previous example is owned by a group of individuals, and that 
under the land is a well of oil. If the land is regulated such that 
any oil taken must be shared equally among all owners, no in-
dividual is incentivized to drill—if an individual does, she alone 
will bear the cost while the group will share equally in the ben-
efit. In this hypothetical, the resource will be underexploited. 
Michael Heller has termed this situation a “tragedy of the anti-
commons.”15 
There are two exceptions, or solutions, to the anticommons 
problem. First, if the benefit is large enough (such that it out-
weighs the cost by a large margin), an individual might ration-
ally choose to drill, knowing that even her equal share will 
outweigh the cost. However, resources of uncertain value are 
particularly susceptible to anti-commons problem, like, for in-
stance, the resources in outer space. The second solution is col-
lective action. Each of the owners could work together, bearing 
the cost equally. However, this solution gives rise to transac-
tion costs (negotiation and decision-making, for example) and 
these costs rise with the number of members in the group. The 
transaction costs between, for example, all of the states on 
Earth would be, well, astronomical. 
This is the problem facing the international community to-
day. Because each state has an equal right to the “benefits” de-
rived from outer space, and because national sovereignty is 
prohibited, no state has been willing to bear the enormous cost 
of exploitation. This is made worse because the benefits of the 
use of outer space will be difficult to quantify until commercial-
ization begins. 
B. A Brief History of Space Law 
The impetus for the original space race was the international 
rivalry of the Cold War,16 specifically the Soviet Union’s launch 
                                                                                                             
 15. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in 
the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624 (1998). 
 16. See John Hickman & Everett Dolman, Resurrecting the Space Age: A 
State-Centered Commentary on the Outer Space Regime, 21 COMP. STRATEGY 
1, 2 (2002). 
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of the Sputnik satellite in 1957.17 The Soviet Union’s ability to 
operate in space was problematic for the United States because 
if any one state obtained control of, or militarized, outer space 
it would gain a tremendous competitive advantage in interna-
tional politics.18 The United States and Soviet Union immedi-
ately began to negotiate the proper uses of outer space.19 
Throughout late 1957 and early 1958, they exchanged “mutual-
ly unacceptable proposals” intended solely to “portray [each 
state] as [a] peacemaker,” which resulted in no settlement.20 
On March 15, 1958, the United States requested that the 
U.N. General Assembly establish an Ad Hoc Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (“ADCOPUOS”).21 ADCOPUOS 
was formed in 1958 and became a permanent body of the U.N. 
the next year.22 Today, the group is known as “COPUOS”. 
COPUOS “is the primary international forum for the develop-
ment of laws and principles governing outer space,”23 and is 
“charged with investigating the legal and political problems 
posed by the use of outer space and determining what role the 
United Nations should play in solving those problems.”24 Ini-
                                                                                                             
 17. Sputnik and the Dawn of the Space Age, NASA, 
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/sputnik (last visited Dec. 24, 2012). 
 18. See Hickman & Dolman, supra note 16, at 3. 
 19. See id. at 4–5. 
 20. Id. at 5. For example, one proposal, clearly intended to be unaccepta-
ble, came from the United States on January 12, 1958, which proposed that 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (“ICBMs”) be prohibited in space. Id. IC-
BMs are long-range missiles that necessarily pass through outer space en 
route to their destination. Id. At this time, the United States had numerous 
foreign bases from which they could strike deep into Soviet territory, while 
the Soviets had none—ICBMs were one of the Soviets’ only equalizing forces. 
Id. This type of ill-willed proposal was representative of the climate of these 
negotiations. 
 21. See Brandon C. Gruner, Comment, A New Hope for International 
Space Law: Incorporating Nineteenth Century First Possession Principles into 
the 1967 Space Treaty for the Colonization of Outer Space in the Twenty-First 
Century, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 299, 321 (2011). 
 22. See Question of the Peaceful Use of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1348 (XIII), 
¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1348(XIII) (Dec. 13, 1958); International Co-operation 
in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1472 (XIV), ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/1472(XIV) (Dec. 12, 1959). 
 23. International Space Law, U.N. OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFF., 
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/index.html (last visited Dec. 
24, 2012). 
 24. Trimble, supra note 9, at 526. 
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tially, COPUOS was a failure, having not even formally met 
during its first two years of existence.25 Then, in 1961, Presi-
dent John F. Kennedy addressed the U.N. General Assembly, 
proposing that the U.N. Charter, the governing document of 
the United Nations, be extended beyond Earth to outer space.26 
In response, COPUOS convened for the first time and agreed 
on a proposal to extend the U.N. Charter to the entire uni-
verse.27 This resolution, Resolution 1721, was passed by the 
UN General Assembly unanimously.28 
To clarify, under Resolution 1721, “the UN claimed legal au-
thority and collective ownership of every natural body, and any 
artificial structure, found anywhere in the universe.”29 Ignor-
ing, for the moment, the legal and rational absurdity of this 
claim (which will be addressed in Part III), Resolution 1721 
was the basic framework from which space law was born. From 
1967 to 1979, COPUOS enacted five major treaties that form 
our space law: (1) the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activ-
ities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, In-
cluding the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the “Outer Space 
Treaty”) in 1967,30 (2) the Agreement on the Rescue of Astro-
nauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space in 1968,31 (3) the Convention on 
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects in 
1972,32 (4) the Convention on the Registration of Objects 
                                                                                                             
 25. See Hickman & Dolman, supra note 16, at 6. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 
G.A. Res. 1721 (XVI), ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1721(XVI) (Dec. 20, 1961) [here-
inafter G.A. Res. 1721]; Hickman & Dolman, supra note 16, at 6. 
 28. Hickman & Dolman, supra note 16, at 6. 
 29. Id. at 18 n.25. 
 30. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1 (entered into force with respect to 
the United States on Oct. 10, 1967). 
 31. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and 
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 
7570 (entered into force with respect to the United States Dec. 3, 1968). 
 32. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space 
Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389 (entered into force with respect to the 
United States Oct. 9, 1973). 
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Launched into Outer Space in 1975,33 and (5) the Agreement 
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Ce-
lestial Bodies (the “Moon Treaty)” in 1979.34 
The two treaties governing property rights of celestial bodies 
are the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty. These two 
treaties establish outer space as res communis—in Latin, a 
“thing” (res) “for everyone” (communis)—or, using the treaty 
language, the “common heritage [or, ‘province’] of mankind.”35 
The res communis approach prohibits national appropriation of 
property in outer space. It was chosen by the United States and 
Soviet Union to “ensur[e] that no state could achieve an unan-
ticipated advantage in space—for if any one state could domi-
nate space, the face of international politics might be changed 
forever.”36 In sum, the common heritage of mankind principle 
was created during the Cold War for geopolitical stability, if 
not out of fear. Non-space-faring states also supported this con-
cept because it allowed all states to collectively “own” outer 
space regardless of their economic development or contribu-
tion.37 
The Outer Space Treaty now has over 100 parties—some 
have argued that it represents customary international law.38 
The Outer Space Treaty is the seminal treaty on space law, and 
the other four treaties, including the Moon Treaty, “are to a 
great extent simply amplifications and clarifications of the 
principles set forth in the Outer Space Treaty.”39 The Moon 
                                                                                                             
 33. Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 
Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695 (entered into force with respect to the United 
States Sept. 15, 1976). 
 34. Moon Treaty, supra note 1. The United States is not a party. 
 35. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. I (using “province of all man-
kind”); Moon Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 4, 11 (using both “province” and 
“common heritage” of mankind). 
 36. Hickman & Dolman, supra note 16, at 3. 
 37. See id. at 7–8; Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, pmbl. (“Believing that 
the exploration and use of outer space should be carried on for the benefit of 
all peoples irrespective of the degree of their economic or scientific develop-
ment.”). 
 38. See ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 339 (2d ed. 
2010) (“The [Outer Space] Treaty’s basic principles . . . can now be regarded 
as representing customary international law.”). 
 39. Trimble, supra note 9, at 528 (quoting C. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 20 (1982) for the proposition that the 
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Treaty has only thirteen signatories and none of them are 
space-faring, which means the Moon Treaty has little relevance 
to the practical discourse on space law.40 
C. The Outer Space Treaty 
The Outer Space Treaty was signed in 1967 and entered into 
force with respect to the United States that same year.41 The 
operative language comes from Article I and II of the treaty. In 
its first sentence, Article I states: “[t]he exploration and use of 
outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, 
shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all 
countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific 
development, and shall be the province of all mankind.”42 “The 
word ‘use’ has been interpreted to mean ‘exploitation’ on a non-
exclusive basis.”43 However, there has been some debate over 
the effect of this clause. In 1967, when the U.S. Congress rati-
fied the Outer Space Treaty, the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations stated that “nothing in Article I, paragraph 
1, diminishes or alters the right of the United States to deter-
mine how . . . it shares the benefits and use of its outer space 
activities.”44 Indeed, some have asserted that “a state or private 
entity would not be required to relinquish its . . . profits from 
space ventures.”45 James Trimble writes: 
[T]he benefits derived from space must be shared with all 
humankind. Sharing expected benefits does not necessarily 
mean sharing profits, but rather is intended more as a philo-
sophical guideline. The manner in which a benefit will be 
shared depends upon the nature of the benefit and the activi-
ty which generates the benefit.46 
                                                                                                             
Outer Space Treaty is the “main base for the legal order of the space envi-
ronment”). 
 40. See AUST, supra note 38, at 340–41. (“When [space] exploitation does 
become feasible, one can expect the major space players to promote another 
treaty better suited to the needs of the time.”). 
 41. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1. 
 42. Id. art. I. 
 43. Trimble, supra note 9, at 530. 
 44. Treaty on Outer Space: Hearings before the S. Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 90th Cong. 74 (1967) [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty Hearings]. 
 45. Trimble, supra note 9, at 530. 
 46. Id. at 560 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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This uncertainty over the type and quantity of benefits to be 
shared is at the root of the anticommons problem. The same 
author concludes, “[c]orporations may undertake space ven-
tures with an expectation of retaining some of the profits to 
reward their efforts, but a portion of the proceeds and benefits 
must be made available to the world community.”47 
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty states, in its entirety: 
“Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is 
not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, 
by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”48 There 
has been debate over whether this anti-appropriation language 
applies to public and private entities, with scholars coming to 
conflicting conclusions.49 So even if private entities are able to 
retain most of their profits through interpretation of Article I, 
it is uncertain whether they can take property without staking 
a sovereign claim to it.50 
The Outer Space Treaty regime made sense during the Cold 
War—both the United States and the Soviet Union sought to 
ensure that neither gained a competitive advantage. And they 
succeeded. But this regime has had a stifling effect on the post-
Cold War international space-economy. 
                                                                                                             
 47. Id. at 567. 
 48. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. II. 
 49. See generally Rosanna Sattler, Transporting a Legal System for Prop-
erty Rights: From the Earth to the Stars, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 23, 28–29 (2005). 
Compare Wayne N. White, Jr., Real Property Rights in Outer Space, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTIETH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 370 
(1998), available at 
http://spacefuture.com/pr/archive/real_property_rights_in_outer_space.shtml 
(“When Article II is compared to similar provisions in other documents, how-
ever, it becomes clear that the narrow interpretation[, which only applies the 
anti-appropriation mandate to public entities,] is correct.”), with Jonathan 
Thomas, Note, Privatization of Space Ventures: Proposing a Proven Regulato-
ry Theory for Future Extraterrestrial Appropriation, 1 INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 
191, 200 (2005) (“The majority of scholars agree that the Outer Space Treaty 
and the anti-appropriation clause apply to both public and private entities.”). 
 50. “[How could] a private entity remove resources or a celestial body from 
space as personal property without making a claim of ownership over the 
land or area itself[?]” John Adolph, Note, The Recent Boom in Private Space 
Development and the Necessity of an International Framework Embracing 
Private Property Rights To Encourage Investment, 40 INT’L LAW. 961, 964 
(2006). 
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To recap, the Outer Space Treaty is problematic for two rea-
sons. First, it prohibits states, and potentially private entities, 
from exercising sovereignty (e.g., appropriating, using, or ex-
ploiting) over outer space. Second, it requires a vague amount 
of the benefits to be shared between all states.51 And, even if a 
party interprets the Outer Space Treaty favorably—to allow 
the private appropriation of property and to allow private enti-
ties to retain all of their profits—the sheer legal uncertainty of 
this interpretation will preclude meaningful investment.52 The 
combination of these problems has created an environment 
where a potential space venture bears all of the cost, and 
stands to lose a significant portion of the return. 
D. The Moon Treaty 
The Moon Treaty was signed in 1979.53 It has only thirteen 
signatories, none of whom are space-faring.54 As such, the rele-
vance of the Moon Treaty is questionable. Nevertheless, a brief 
overview will highlight the concerns of space-faring states and 
explain why the Moon Treaty has not been ratified by any such 
state. 
The Moon Treaty classifies outer space as the common herit-
age of mankind, contains a more inclusive non-appropriation 
clause, and contains a more direct requirement that benefits be 
shared equally among all states. Article 11, paragraph 3 states: 
                                                                                                             
 51. See, e.g., White, supra note 49 (“Existing inter-national law provides 
limited legal protection and little incentive for investment in outer space.”); 
Trimble, supra note 9, at 565 (“The greatest negative effect of international 
space law is the uncertainty of the principles contained in the space treaties. 
A determinative factor in a corporate decision to undertake a commercial 
space venture will be [among other things] to what extent the corporation 
believes international space law provides freedom from . . . deprivation relat-
ing to its right to conduct business, its equipment, its employees, its technol-
ogy, and its profits.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted). 
 52. See id.; see also Evan Sankey, Coase, Incentives, and the Final Fron-
tier, 1 ECONPRESS 67, 70 (2010) (“Even if some narrow conception of proper-
ty rights can be teased out of the language of [the Outer Space Treaty], the 
wide range of interpretations seems to defeat the purpose of property law. . . . 
I cannot imagine a wealthy person who would provide the venture capital for, 
say, a lunar mining company without being absolutely sure that said compa-
ny could procure widely recognized rights to property on the Moon.”). 
 53. Moon Treaty, supra note 1. 
 54. See AUST, supra note 38, at 340. 
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“Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon [or any ce-
lestial body] . . . shall become property of any state, interna-
tional, inter-governmental or non-governmental organization, 
national organization or non-governmental entity or of any 
natural person.”55 Therefore, under the Moon Treaty, not even 
private entities can appropriate property in outer space. Article 
11 continues: “State Parties to this Agreement hereby under-
take to establish an international regime, including appropri-
ate procedures, to govern the exploitation of the natural re-
sources of the Moon as such exploitation is about to become 
feasible.” The appropriation of property is therefore outlawed, 
pending the establishment of an international organization to 
facilitate it. 
Space-faring states make two major arguments against the 
Moon Treaty. First, these states claim that the language places 
“a moratorium on the commercial exploitation of resources un-
til the international regime is established”56—no regime has 
yet been established. Second, space-faring states allege that, 
once the regime is established, it will be “unsympathetic to free 
enterprise”57 because the benefits will have to be divided equal-
ly among all states, regardless of their economic contribution.58 
In these ways, the Moon Treaty goes a step further than the 
Outer Space Treaty, but because it has failed to gain the sup-
port of any space-faring state, it has little relevance to enforce-
able space law. 
                                                                                                             
 55. White, supra note 49 (“[R]eferences to ‘the moon’ in the Moon Treaty 
refer to all celestial bodies and areas of outer space other than Earth and 
Earth orbits.”). 
 56. Trimble, supra note 9, at 549. 
 57. Id. at 550. See also White, supra note 49 (“As a result, the Moon Treaty 
has encountered resistance from countries with free market economies.”). 
 58. See Gruner, supra note 21, at 328–29 (“The United States’ primary 
concern was that the incorporation of Common Heritage principles . . . would 
discourage development by United States government agencies or private 
companies, since developers of resources would lose control over those re-
sources to an international regime after that developer spent money harvest-
ing the resources.”). 
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E. Other Applications of the Res Communis Principle 
The res communis principle has been applied to two other in-
ternational territories, Antarctica and the deep sea, and has 
resulted in a similar collective inaction problem. 
1. Antarctica 
Antarctica is governed by a series of treaties: the Antarctic 
Treaty of 1959,59 the Environmental Protocol of 1991,60 the 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources of 1980,61 the Convention on the Conservation of 
Antarctic Seals of 1972,62 and the various measures adopted 
under each (collectively, the “ATS”).63 The ATS is unique be-
cause it suspends, but does not renounce, the numerous state 
claims of sovereignty over various parts of Antarctica.64 Indeed, 
numerous states had and still hold claims to parts of Antarcti-
ca, but each recognized that, as the preamble to the Antarctic 
Treaty states, “it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarc-
tica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful 
purposes and shall not become the scene or object of interna-
tional discord.”65 Importantly, the ATS adopts a res communis 
approach and restricts the use of Antarctica to scientific explo-
ration.66 
The Antarctic Treaty divides its members into two categories: 
consultative parties and non-consultative parties.67 The consul-
tative parties have demonstrated an “interest in Antarctica by 
                                                                                                             
 59. The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71. 
 60. Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, opened 
for signature Oct. 4, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1460 [hereinafter Environmental Proto-
col]. 
 61. Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 
May 20, 1980, 1329 U.N.T.S. 47. 
 62. Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, June 1, 1972, 29 
U.S.T. 441, 1080 U.N.T.S. 175. 
 63. See AUST, supra note 38, at 328. 
 64. See The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 59, art. XI. 
 65. Id. at pmbl. 
 66. See id. arts. II, IV, VII. 
 67. See Andrew H. Pontious, Note, A Proposed Regime and Its Ramifica-
tions on the Commercialization of Outer Space, 7 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 157, 164 (1991). 
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conducting substantial scientific research activity there.”68 Un-
der the ATS, the consultative parties are also the ones who 
make binding decisions concerning the uses of Antarctica.69 
“The non-consultative parties are those states which have ac-
ceded to the treaty but have not yet complied with the ‘demon-
strated interest’ test.”70 The non-consultative parties cannot 
vote, but may observe the decision-making meetings.71 This 
system keeps control of Antarctica in the hands of those states 
with true, vested interests. 
In the 1970s, mining companies attempted to adopt a conven-
tion to regulate mining and the development of resources in 
Antarctica.72 Environmental groups, however, strongly opposed 
the initiative, and it was not adopted. As a result, the Envi-
ronmental Protocol of 1991 governs, which strictly prohibits all 
non-scientific mining in Antarctica.73 The ATS’ use of the res 
communis principle has been prohibitive of commercialization 
(beyond tourism) and environmental groups have refused to 
allow it. 
2. The Deep Sea 
The deep sea is governed by the U.N. Convention on the Law 
of the Sea of 1982 (“UNCLOS”).74 Like the Moon Treaty, and 
similar to the Outer Space Treaty, UNCLOS uses the term 
“common heritage of mankind.” Under UNCLOS, the deep sea 
and ocean floor, which do not come under the purview of any 
state’s territorial sovereignty, are classified as the common her-
                                                                                                             
 68. The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 59, art. IX (providing “the establish-
ment of a scientific station or the despatch [sic] of a scientific expedition” as 
examples of substantial Antarctic research activity). 
 69. See Pontious, supra note 67, at 165. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. 
 72. The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activ-
ities “sought to regulate minerals prospecting, exploration and development 
activities, although mining would only be permitted if all Parties agreed that 
there was no risk to the environment.” Mining in Antarctica, BRIT. ANTARCTIC 
SURV., 
http://www.antarctica.ac.uk/about_antarctica/geopolitical/environmental_issu
es/mining.php (last visited Jan. 2, 2013). 
 73. See Environmental Protocol, supra note 60, art. 7. 
 74. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 
Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
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itage of mankind.75 These areas are rich in mineral deposits.76 
So, naturally, many states and private entities wish to mine 
these deposits. When UNCLOS was being negotiated—at the 
same time, incidentally, as the Moon Treaty—the developed 
states were wary of adopting a res communis regime (for the 
same reasons discussed above with the Moon Treaty) and the 
developing states sought to adopt a res communis regime so 
that they would not be disadvantaged by their inability to par-
ticipate.77 In contrast with the ATS, “membership in UNCLOS 
is not limited to those involved in active exploration, and each 
member may cast one vote.”78 Which, given the larger number 
of developing states, resulted in the adoption of the res com-
munis principle.79 However, similar to the Moon Treaty, 
UNCLOS called for the establishment of an independent body 
to regulate exploitation, and in 1994, the International Seabed 
Authority (“ISA”) was established to regulate mining opera-
tions.80 
The ISA governs deep sea exploitation by requiring miners to 
pay fees amounting to $500,000, part of which is given to non-
mining states. The ISA operates under three phases: (1) pro-
specting, or the non-exclusive search for minerals, which can be 
done for free; (2) exploration, in which a state or private entity 
can explore mineral deposits with exclusivity for $250,000; and 
(3) exploitation, which is the actual commercial recovery of 
minerals for a fee of $250,000.81 Applicants are also required to 
set aside a minable area of equal size to be reserved for mining 
by the ISA’s intergovernmental mining body, whose purpose is 
                                                                                                             
 75. See Sattler, supra note 49, at 34. 
 76. See AUST, supra note 38, at 290 (“[The area] is important because parts 
of it (mostly in the Pacific and Indian Oceans) are rich in mineral nodules 
(lumps), manganese in particular.”). 
 77. See Sattler, supra note 49, at 34–35. 
 78. Id. at 34. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See UNCLOS, supra note 74, art. 156. 
 81. See International Seabed Authority, Decision of the Assembly Relating 
to the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules 
in the Area, 6th Sess., 76th mtg., § 1 ¶ 3(a)–(c), § 3 ¶ 1–3, U.N. Doc 
ISBA/6/A/18, at 2, 12–13 (July 13, 2000); Zell, supra note 5, at 502–03. 
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to “compete with the private entities granted licenses by the 
ISA.”82 
To this day, mining has failed to develop, likely due to the ef-
fects of this common heritage of mankind regime and the huge 
costs ($500,000 in fees plus the mandatory reserves) associated 
with development.83 Indeed, the United States and other indus-
trialized states are not a party to UNCLOS.84 In sum: 
[B]ecause UNCLOS required mandatory transfers of technol-
ogy, employed an economic model that preempted free-market 
enterprise, failed to assure access to future deep seabed re-
sources, and included a voting structure that gave all nations 
equal control regardless of their technological capabilities or 
contributions to undersea exploration, the United States and 
other industrialized nations refused to ratify the 1982 agree-
ment.85 
II. SEARCHING FOR THE OPTIMAL REGIME 
A number of scholars have offered solutions to the anticom-
mons problem in space. These proposals range from mirroring 
the regime used in Antarctica to auctioning off planets. This 
Part will analyze nine of the leading theories in a search for the 
optimal regime. Many of the proposals assume the legitimacy 
of the common heritage of mankind principle, while others re-
ject it. Several attempt to interpret the relevant language of 
the Outer Space Treaty to allow for private property rights, 
and thus claim to operate within its bounds. 
Ultimately, in Part III, this Article concludes that the com-
mon heritage of mankind principle should be rejected and of-
fers a solution accordingly. Each section below will clarify 
                                                                                                             
 82. Sattler, supra note 49, at 34. See also UNCLOS, supra note 74, at an-
nex III, art. 8. 
 83. See also Sattler, supra note 49, at 44. 
 84. See AUST, supra note 38, at 279; Sattler, supra note 49, at 35. 
 85. Sattler, supra note 49, at 34–35. In the mid-90s the U.N. renegotiated 
several aspects of UNCLOS including guaranteeing the United States a seat 
on the decision-making body and removing the requirement of transfers of 
technology. See id. at 35. Although the United States was involved in the ne-
gotiations, and the United States signed the amended UNCLOS in 1994, the 
Senate has still not ratified it—which indicates that, even in its amended 
form, a common heritage of mankind regime is unsupported by free-
enterprise nations. See id. 
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whether the author of the proposal under review assumes or 
rejects the legitimacy of the common heritage of mankind prin-
ciple. 
A. Proposals Mirroring Existing Regimes 
The first three proposals mirror regimes in use today. They 
will be covered initially because they are the least likely to 
yield different results—each incorporates the res communis 
principle, which has resulted in a tragedy of the anticommons. 
1. Mirror UNCLOS 
Jeremy Zell suggests mirroring UNCLOS’ ISA structure with 
the establishment of a Space Resource Authority (“SRA”).86 
This proposal assumes that the common heritage of mankind 
regime is legitimate, and that all states are deserving of at 
least some of the benefits of outer space. As discussed previous-
ly, the ISA requires that miners: (1) pay fees to obtain proprie-
tary rights over discovered resources ($500,000), which are al-
located to non-mining states; and (2) set aside a mining area of 
equal size to be mined sometime in the future by the ISA itself 
(known as “reserves”). The SRA would mirror this structure 
with slight modifications. 
Similar to the ISA, prospecting under the SRA regime would 
be free and subsequently obtaining proprietary rights would 
require fees. Once mining begins, the entity would be required 
to pay royalties to the SRA. The entity would also be required 
to set aside reserves; however, the reserves would not be set 
aside for the SRA, itself, to mine, but instead would be sold to 
other states.87 The proceeds would then be equally distributed 
to non-space-faring states.88 While the proceeds from reserve 
sales would go directly to non-space-faring states, the fees and 
royalties from activity would not.89 The SRA would offer reduc-
tions of the royalties, fees, and reserve areas for entities that 
operate in non-space-faring states.90 Zell’s idea here is to en-
                                                                                                             
 86. See generally Zell, supra note 5, at 492–93. 
 87. See id. at 510–11. 
 88. Id. at 511. 
 89. Zell does not say where the proceeds from fees and royalties would go; 
presumably the proceeds would fund the SRA. 
 90. See Zell, supra note 5, at 512–14. 
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courage the development of non-space-faring states by incentiv-
izing the operation of Earth-based space functions in those 
states. Examples of potential space operations that could be 
conducted in non-space-faring states include mission control 
stations, equipment manufacturing, and launch sites. The anti-
commons problem, however, remains. 
Again, under the hypothetical SRA, all of the cost and only a 
portion of benefit go to the space-faring entities. This system is 
effectively the same as the current one. With respect to the re-
serves, the state to whom the reserve is ultimately sold or the 
method by which that state obtains it does not affect the origi-
nal mining entity’s incentives. Still, it must put up the initial 
investment and part with a substantial portion of the mining 
area without being adequately compensated—the original min-
ing entity is not selling it, but giving it away to the SRA to sell. 
With respect to the potential reduction of fees, royalties, and 
reserves, even if they can be reduced or forgiven, there are hid-
den costs in obtaining such reductions that create a subtler, 
deeper problem. 
The problem with the proposed reduction in fees, royalties, 
and reserves is that developing states do not have the technol-
ogy, government, security, or infrastructure to support many of 
the necessary operations. The cost of developing and establish-
ing those necessities in under-developed states will require an 
enormous investment. Space-faring entities are able to conduct 
activities in space because of the security and stability of their 
Earth-based operations. Developing states with, for instance, 
weak police enforcement, undeveloped laws, or unreliable en-
ergy sources could put space operations at a huge risk. One can 
imagine situations where a command center loses power during 
a space mission, or one in which corrupt officials are able to 
deny police protection to facilities without the payment of 
bribes. These are examples of necessities that we often take for 
granted but that are essential to the safe and efficient opera-
tion of space activity. The cost of developing these necessary 
elements in under-developed states will be borne by the space-
faring states in order to obtain reductions. This investment is 
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effectively a fee.91 For this reason, Zell’s solution is likely to re-
sult in the same inefficiencies that we face today. 
2. Mirror the ATS 
Andrew Pontious suggests adopting a regime similar to the 
ATS.92 Again, this proposal contemplates the continuation of 
the common heritage of mankind principle, and therefore oper-
ates under the assumption that all states are entitled to at 
least some portion of outer space and its resources. Pontious 
suggests a decision-making structure that will mirror the ATS’ 
consultative/non-consultative structure, but instead uses 
states’ levels of investment to determine voting status.93 Only 
those states which meet a certain threshold level of investment 
will be allowed to vote (compared to the ATS threshold of 
“demonstrated interest”). 
In addition to the decision-making structure, Pontious pro-
vides three general principles that such a regime must include: 
1) [A] call for regulation of activities only by those undertak-
ing the activities (albeit with the input of non-participant 
members); and 2) it must not require the transfer of specific 
amounts of resources, benefits, or technology, to countries not 
undertaking the risks of development; and 3) must allow for 
some express distribution of benefits to all member coun-
tries.94 
It is not entirely clear, but it seems as if the distinction be-
tween the second principle and the third principle is that the 
third principle benefits are, in some form, distributed to all 
member countries that are undertaking the risks of develop-
ment. How a country obtains the status of “undertaking the 
risks of development” is left unanswered—certainly not by non-
consultative membership alone, as there must be some level of 
                                                                                                             
 91. The author seems to inadvertently make this point. See id. at 515 (“[I]t 
is possible for [a space-faring entity] to receive complete forgiveness of its fee 
and royalty obligations with a large enough investment in developing na-
tions.”). The problem, of course, is that we cannot ignore that “large enough 
investment.” 
 92. See Pontious, supra note 67, at 184 (“[A] regime similar to but not 
identical to that of Antarctica should be adopted.”). 
 93. See id. 
 94. Id. at 187. 
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contribution (monetary or otherwise). Assuming this is the 
case, this proposal is superior to a pure common heritage of 
mankind regime because states’ contributions are taken into 
consideration when distributing benefits. Still, the problem 
remains that different entities putting up different investments 
will likely yield different returns. And requiring them to share 
all or “some express amount” of returns will incentivize entities 
to invest the lowest possible amount while still retaining their 
allocation of the returns—a type of moral hazard. This is the 
classic anticommons problem. 
This is not to say that any form of return allocation will de-
stroy market efficiencies. Royalties and fees, for instance, are 
used in several industries today.95 But, these regimes are dif-
ferent from a regime mandating the “express distribution of 
benefits to all member[s],” particularly because the moral haz-
ard problem is not present. 
3. Mirror the International Space Station Intergovernmental 
Agreement 
In a 2005 article, Rosanna Sattler proposes what she consid-
ers to be “the most workable model for a property rights regime 
in outer space” for the short term.96 Her model is based on the 
International Space Station Intergovernmental Agreement 
(“IGA”). The IGA has a “hub and spoke structure” with NASA 
acting as the hub. NASA signs Memoranda of Understanding 
with other space agencies, which, together, govern the Interna-
tional Space Station (“ISS”), a research lab in low Earth orbit.97 
Under this regime, 
The members of the IGA contribute funds and technology, 
and each owns some portion of the space station. The country 
with the ownership interest retains control of its particular 
physical module and its crew. The nation may contract with 
other countries that wish to use its portion for scientific re-
search. The work that takes place on the module then re-
                                                                                                             
 95. Indeed, while UNCLOS was being negotiated, the United States 
passed the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, which “requires that 
undersea mining companies apply for permits and licenses to mine the deep 
seabed.” Sattler, supra note 49, at 36. 
 96. Id. at 37. 
 97. See id. at 37–38. 
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mains subject to the laws of that nation and is considered to 
be within its jurisdiction.98 
NASA then “serves as the coordinator,”99 and disputes are set-
tled by the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) or World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”), depending on the nature of the 
dispute.100 
According to Sattler’s proposal, this IGA regime could be ap-
plied to the commercialization of space.101 NASA could continue 
to serve as the coordinator unless a non-governmental organi-
zation is agreed upon by the participating states. Other coun-
tries would contribute funds and place technology on the Moon 
through their space agencies. These space agencies would se-
cure the technology and funding from private businesses which 
enter into contracts for such services with these agencies. In 
accordance with the terms of the IGA and the Outer Space 
Treaty, each individual country, or space agency, would retain 
jurisdiction over its crew, its spacecraft, and any structures or 
equipment.102 It is unclear how certain forms of commercializa-
tion, mining for instance, would mesh with Sattler’s intent to 
remain in “accordance with the terms of . . . the Outer Space 
Treaty.”103 
                                                                                                             
 98. Id. at 38. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See id. 
 101. See id. at 39 (“The IGA could easily be applied to space tourism, set-
tlement, development, and bases of operation on asteroids, the moon, and 
Mars.”). 
 102. See id. 
 103. Sattler’s earlier analysis of the Outer Space Treaty outlines the differ-
ing interpretations (that the Outer Space Treaty might only prohibit the na-
tional appropriation of land, and that “land” might not include the resources 
mined from the land) but ultimately Sattler remarks that “the appropriation 
provision of the treaty is . . . unworkable.” Id. at 28–29. In all likelihood, Sat-
tler is interested only in according with the agreeable terms of the Outer 
Space Treaty, which would not include the prohibition on property appropria-
tion. This is supported by the lack of benefit-sharing discussion in Sattler’s 
article. She does remark, in her conclusion, that “[t]here would be a need to 
accommodate the views of nations with space resources and those in process 
of development.” Id. at 44. This suggests that Sattler is assuming all states 
are due some portion of outer space, although this point is not clear. Still, 
Sattler’s proposal can be implemented in any number of property right distri-
butions. 
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Sattler proposes adopting the concept of Exclusive Economic 
Zones (“EEZs”) to supplement the IGA regime. EEZs are areas 
up to 200 miles from a state’s coast which that state has the 
right to “declare” as an EEZ.104 Once declared, that state has 
the “exclusive right to explore, exploit, conserve, and manage 
the natural resources” located in the EEZ, subject only to the 
right of other states to “navigate through the waters, fly over 
the area, and lay pipelines or other cables on the seafloor.”105 
Other states cannot conduct commercial activity in another 
state’s EEZ, but states are free to license or rent the area or 
resources.106 Sattler proposes transferring this EEZ system to 
outer space. Sattler would “giv[e] each nation the option of 
building a structure on a celestial body or occupying an orbit 
with spacecraft, and then claiming up to a certain amount of 
area around their structure or craft for their use.”107 Indeed the 
IGA already uses this approach with respect to ISS vessels.108 
Sattler’s thought is that “each nation would retain jurisdiction 
over its EEZ and could create its own regulations and permit-
ting procedures.”109 
Sattler presents a very workable theory, particularly for 
practical purposes. However, Sattler provides no method of al-
locating property in the first place. Certainly, Sattler is not 
proposing that all a state or entity needs to do is drop a space-
craft down on a planet to obtain an EEZ over the surrounding 
area—this would incentivize the placement of numerous, likely 
meaningless, vessels all over the reachable property within our 
galaxy. Building on Sattler’s proposal, however, a regime for 
defining or distributing property rights over outer space could 
utilize the IGA/EEZ regime to govern the use of certain proper-
ty and the interaction of states around it.110 Without a base 
property regime, Sattler’s proposal passes on the fundamental 
question of how to distribute property rights in outer space. 
                                                                                                             
 104. See id. at 42. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See id. This is a concept embodied in Part V of UNCLOS, and even the 
United States has declared an EEZ. See id. at 41–42. 
 107. Id. at 43. 
 108. See id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. This will be revisited in Part III. 
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B. State-Centered Property Rights 
John Hickman and Everett Dolman offer a solution under 
which “a state would be permitted to claim sovereignty over 
territory on a large celestial body in proportion to its share of 
the Earth’s land surface.”111 The particular piece of land a state 
claimed would be determined by “the priority of arrival by its 
human representatives.”112 This theory is informed by the 
Coase Theorem, which suggests that if transaction costs are 
low or zero, any allocation of property rights is preferable to no 
allocation of property rights.113 This is because, regardless of 
how the property rights are allocated initially, the individuals 
who value it most will purchase it from the existing owner.114 
The authors conclude that “if the policy goal is to encourage the 
development of outer space, then any assignment of sovereign-
ty over territory on celestial bodies would be preferable to the 
existing structure of vesting collective rights in all states.”115 
The State-Centered solution requires withdrawing from the 
Outer Space Treaty, but, importantly, it does not abandon the 
common heritage of mankind principle because it vests rights 
in all states by virtue of their territory (not their contribution 
or investment).116 This “proportional allocation upon arrival” 
solution was chosen over assigning territory pre-arrival be-
cause pre-arrival assignments would not have incentivized 
space-faring states to hasten their development of space tech-
nologies.117 Allocation upon arrival also avoids having to de-
termine which bit of land to assign to each state, which would 
be unsolvable given the varying quality of celestial territory. 
                                                                                                             
 111. Hickman & Dolman, supra note 16, at 14. The authors also considered 
basing the proportional allocation off of GDP and population, but ultimately 
declined to do so because of the perverse population growth and GDP report-
ing incentives they could create. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See id. at 12. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
 114. See generally id. 
 115. Hickman & Dolman, supra note 16, at 12. 
 116. See id. at 13–14 (“The solution would continue to designate genuine 
common pool resources as res communis while permitting space faring states 
to claim sovereign ownership of territory on celestial bodies and other 
geo/astrographic positions.”). 
 117. See id. at 14. 
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The authors argue that this solution would garner at least 
some support from developing states: 
Japan, Malaysia, and Thailand might assert sovereignty over 
adjacent territories on Mars by sending a joint team of human 
representatives together on a Japanese spacecraft. Interna-
tional inequality would be reduced because non-space faring 
states would be at liberty to lease or sell outright their sover-
eign territories on celestial bodies to other states.118 
The primary problem with this solution is that it assumes the 
legitimacy of the common heritage of mankind principle. In 
this iteration, the entities or states that put up the cost retain 
all of their return on investment, but that return is limited to 
the land area of the state or the entity’s state of origin. In order 
for an entity to obtain more property it would need to pay oth-
er, non-space-faring states, which allocates return to states 
that are not putting up the cost. 
Another consequence of this solution is that states with small 
territories are massively disadvantaged. The absurdity of this 
result can be illustrated in a few examples.119 Consider Japan, 
which has a land area of 145,920 square miles. The total land 
area of Earth (excluding the oceans) is 57,510,000 square 
miles. This means Japan’s proportional allocation of any celes-
tial body is limited to, roughly, 0.25%. The actual amount of 
property this 0.25% represents depends upon the size of the 
celestial body. However, this small percentage would likely 
provide very little incentive for states like Japan, who have the 
technological capability of commercializing outer space but are 
only entitled to a small fraction of those resources by virtue of 
their small territory on Earth. This small fraction of territory 
might not yield enough gains to incentivize Japan to invest. So 
too could the cost of purchasing additional territory from non-
space-faring states be prohibitive, particularly if those states 
demand high prices for their territorial rights. 
                                                                                                             
 118. Id. 
 119. All geographical information analyzed in the following examples is 
derived from CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA), THE WORLD FACTBOOK, 
COUNTRY COMPARISONS: AREA, available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2147rank.html. 
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Consider the other side of the spectrum. Sudan, for instance, 
is the tenth largest state by land area, at 967,500 square miles. 
This entitles it to roughly 1.7% of any celestial body. Sudan 
does not have a space program.120 This State-Centered regime 
would give Sudan a huge benefit without requiring any in-
vestment in space commercialization. Smaller states, like Ja-
pan, will be forced to purchase property rights from larger de-
veloping states, simply by virtue of having a smaller territory 
on Earth. In fact, under this system, Russia would have a right 
to roughly 11.5% of every single celestial body in the uni-
verse—the next closest state is Canada with 6.7%—and the 
other states of Earth would certainly be wary of such a re-
gime.121 Israel, for example, is space-faring, but is only entitled 
to 0.01%. 
Further, the transaction costs of these bargains would be 
very high. In a market with perfect information there would be 
no transaction costs or holdouts. But transaction costs “are 
likely to be high, at least where rights holders are widely dis-
persed and the value of rights is subject to a great deal of im-
precision,” as they would be in international bargaining over 
plots of celestial property.122 
A practical problem with this solution is that not all outer 
space resources can be divided by territorial surface distinc-
tions. Consider the atmosphere of a celestial body—for in-
stance, the nitrogen in the atmosphere of Mars, which could be 
used for rocket fuel.123 Allocating different pieces of the Mar-
tian territory will not inform the portion of the atmosphere to 
which each state is entitled. Indeed, the same problem arises 
with underground reserves, for example, oil wells stretching 
across multiple plots of land. 
                                                                                                             
 120. See generally Space Program of the Sudan, SUDANESE SPACE AGENCY, 
http://www.hudsonfla.com/asudan.htm (last visited Dec. 24, 2012) (“[Sudan’s] 
space program is . . . nonexistent.”). 
 121. Russia is 6,601,100 square miles and Canada is 3,855,100 square 
miles. 
 122. Robert P. Merges & Glenn H. Reynolds, Space Resources, Common 
Property, and the Collective Action Problem, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 107, 116 
(1997). The high transaction costs involved with pre-arrival valuations of 
celestial resources are dealt with in more detail in Part II.D. 
 123. See Rocket Fuel from Mars’ Atmosphere, 22 MEMBRANE & SEPARATION 
TECH. NEWS, (Jan. 1, 2004), http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-
653172/Rocket-Fuel-from-Mars-Atmosphere.html. 
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Hickman and Dolman might suggest the implementation of a 
number of property regulations, similar to those on Earth, to 
protect and control the harvesting of underground resources—
like, for instance, the rule that so long as land owners drill 
straight down under the land, they may extract a resource even 
if it is drained from a part of the well located under neighbor-
ing land (the so-called “bottoming rule”)124 or regulations on 
“the number of acres required for a well and requiring appor-
tionment of the drilling profits among the surface owners with-
in the acreage unit.”125 Terrestrial property laws may mitigate 
the problem of controlling underground resources, but they 
cannot eliminate it. 
Consider a different iteration of this problem: the “seed in the 
middle of the fruit” situation. Imagine that a valuable resource 
is located in the very center of an NEA. If we divide up the sur-
face territory on the NEA between all states, or only those who 
reach it, we have a problem. If we assume that the NEA is a 
sphere, then the resource at the core is accessible from every 
spot on the NEA. How are we to divide this resource? Logically, 
if the resource is truly at the center of the NEA and accessible 
from all points on the surface, each state would be entitled to 
its proportional share. In this case, then, we have a space-
faring entity with an entitlement to only a fraction of the re-
source no matter when it reached the NEA or the cost it expend-
ed doing so. This not only removes the incentive to reach outer 
space resources quickly, but may reduce the incentive to reach 
them at all, as the investing entity will have to share the re-
source with all states proportionally to its land area. 
What is worse, resources at the core of NEAs and other celes-
tial bodies may not be knowable until commercialization be-
gins. Imagine the frustration of a space-faring state which puts 
up all the cost and successfully reaches an NEA, only to find 
that its percentage of the resource is miniscule—and, because 
not all states are space-faring, the space-faring state just has to 
leave the part of the resource to which it is not entitled un-
touched, which is a huge inefficiency. This risk is a powerful 
disincentive, and, practically, is very similar to the common 
heritage of mankind principle in the first place. The State-
                                                                                                             
 124. See KRIER, supra note 12, at 7. 
 125. Id. 
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Centered solution is interesting, but limiting the gains of 
space-faring entities to a portion relative to their land area on 
Earth gives rise to problems that will likely result in similar, 
potentially prohibitive, disincentives. 
C. Functional Property Rights 
Wayne White proposes a regime of Functional Property 
Rights.126 This solution would grant non-sovereign property 
rights to private entities (but not states) who control space ob-
jects by virtue of (a) that control and (b) personnel at the loca-
tion.127 White argues that a state’s legislation would extend to 
the area of occupation through its citizens who occupy the area. 
Private entities would thereby have law under which to oper-
ate, but the territory would not be owned by that state.128 The 
areas that an entity could occupy would be determined on a 
first-come, first-served basis.129 White writes: “These rights 
would terminate if activity were halted, as for example, if a 
space object was abandoned or returned to Earth. [Additional-
ly], rights would be limited to the area occupied by the space 
object, and to a reasonable safety area around the facility.”130 
This regime would allow individual states to determine the 
conditions necessary for their citizens and corporations to es-
tablish and maintain private property rights and the terms of 
abandonment—the inactivity which would extinguish such 
rights.131 White argues that these rights, although non-
sovereign, would be “almost identical to terrestrial property 
rights.”132 
White argues that territorial sovereignty should be prohibit-
ed and therefore, under his regime, only private entities may 
appropriate extraterrestrial property.133 He does this for two 
reasons. First, he believes that his proposal is permitted under 
the Outer Space Treaty. White subscribes to the interpretation 
of the Outer Space Treaty which holds that “Article II . . . pro-
                                                                                                             
 126. See generally White, supra note 49. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See id. 
 130. Id. This is similar to Sattler’s EEZ proposal. 
 131. See id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See id. 
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hibits territorial sovereignty but does not prohibit private ap-
propriation.”134 As discussed above, this interpretation is highly 
contentious. Second, White argues that sovereign property 
rights “could potentially preclude free access to outer space.”135 
Why free access to all of outer space is necessary is not stated, 
although one can infer that White subscribes to the res com-
munis principle. 
Even ignoring his adherence to res communis, there is a more 
fundamental question. White states that “[t]hese rights would 
terminate if activity were halted, as for example, if a space ob-
ject was abandoned or returned to Earth.”136 This seems wholly 
incompatible with the practical advantages of private property 
rights. Does this mean that once a resource is returned to 
Earth for manufacture or sale the private entity loses all claim 
to ownership? Certainly this cannot be the case, because only 
celestial operations which do not require the transfer of re-
sources back to Earth would be profitable. This would elimi-
nate a large number of proposed uses—mining and energy pro-
duction, for example. But, even if we assume that private enti-
ties can keep the resources they return to Earth, there are fur-
ther problems. 
If no one truly owns the territory, potentially harmful or inef-
ficient uses will go unpunished because entities can simply use 
the land and then abandon it. Further, entities will have no 
incentive to use the land efficiently or to get the most out of re-
sources—there are no long-term incentives. “The results are 
intuitive. Who takes better care of a house, an owner or a rent-
er?”137 Of course, regulations could be established by an inter-
governmental body which could regulate the uses and practices 
on celestial bodies. This would add transaction costs. However, 
those costs might be naturally mitigated if states could, at 
some point, exercise some form of sovereignty over celestial 
                                                                                                             
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. (emphasis added). 
 137. Sam Dinkin, Property Rights and Space Commercialization, SPACE 
REV. (May 10, 2004), http://thespacereview.com/article/141/1. 
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territory.138 This option will be explored in more detail later in 
this Article.139 
D. Unilateral Domestic Auctions (Pseudo Property Rights) 
Economist Sam Dinkin has proposed an interesting property 
rights regime in which the United States would unilaterally 
grant what he calls “pseudo property rights” to its citizens 
through domestic auctions.140 Pseudo property rights are nec-
essary, Dinkin believes, because true property rights are una-
vailable, or at least questionable, under the Outer Space Trea-
ty. Dinkin reasons that because the Outer Space Treaty prohib-
its states from making sovereign claims to outer space, the 
treaty “effectively limits the property rights that U.S. can grant 
to its citizens.”141 However, Article VI of the Outer Space Trea-
ty does say that “[t]he activities of non-governmental entities in 
outer space . . . shall require authorization and continuing su-
pervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.” Under 
Dinkin’s interpretation, this provision allows a state to regu-
late the activity of its citizens in outer space.142 Dinkin argues 
further that, because a property right is essentially “a right to 
exclude someone from doing something[,] [b]y excluding US cit-
izens and corporations from doing certain things, the US can 
create pseudo property rights in outer space for other US citi-
zens and corporations.”143 Dinkin likens these pseudo property 
                                                                                                             
 138. The idea being that, if nations were working towards establishing ter-
ritorial sovereignty, they would take better, more efficient care of the proper-
ty (having an eye towards long term return). 
 139. Specifically in Part III. 
 140. See generally Dinkin, supra note 137. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See id. Several scholars support this interpretation. See, e.g., Trimble, 
supra note 9, at 563–64. 
Space law has an additional effect on corporations’ space activities 
through the grant of jurisdiction to the United States over space ob-
jects and their personnel. This jurisdiction provides the United 
States with broad powers to regulate corporate activities in space . . . 
This authority is necessary in order for the United States to comply 
with its obligation to authorize and supervise the activities of its cit-
izens in space. 
Id. 
 143. Dinkin, supra note 137. 
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rights to the U.S. patent system.144 This regime could arguably 
hold water under the Outer Space Treaty’s prohibition on terri-
torial sovereignty because the United States would only be 
regulating the actions of its citizens, not the territory or prop-
erty itself. Dinkin writes: 
The US should begin to regulate these pseudo property rights. 
We should register them. We should hold hearings on them. 
We should auction them off in some cases where there is con-
tention just like for spectrum licenses or government land. We 
should hold the money in trust until the international com-
munity decides who should get it. The President should estab-
lish a property rights regime by executive order that is later 
written into law by Congress.145 
Implicit in this quotation are several points worth discussing. 
First, this theory presents the same problem we had with 
White’s proposal: what happens when resources are returned to 
Earth? In this case, the United States could no longer rely upon 
Article VI because the non-governmental entities are no longer 
in space, and any subsequent grant of private property rights 
in the celestial resources would violate Dinkin’s interpretation 
that private property rights are prohibited under the Outer 
Space Treaty. 
Additionally, Dinkin states that “[w]e should hold the money 
in trust until the international community decides who should 
get it.”146 Why Dinkin wants the international community to 
decide who gets the money is unclear. Perhaps he believes that 
this money will satisfy the Outer Space Treaty’s province of 
mankind principle—that each state is due its share of outer 
space. Placing the funds in such a trust is unlikely to be work-
able for two reasons. First, the U.S. agency responsible for the 
hearings and auctions will likely need the money for funding, 
unless it tries to raise taxes or divert already stretched funds. 
Second, the United States has already stated that, under its 
interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty, “nothing in Article I, 
paragraph 1, diminishes or alters the right of the United States 
to determine how . . . it shares the benefits and use of its outer 
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space activities.”147 Of course the United States could, of its 
own good will, provide these funds to other states, but it is un-
likely to do so—particularly when it could use the money to 
fund the auctions. Dinkin does not clarify this problem. 
There are several other problems that Dinkin does anticipate. 
“Having a piece of paper from the United States saying that no 
US entities may interfere with what you are doing does not 
necessarily give a US person or business the right to do some-
thing.”148 There are two potential problems here which Dinkin 
anticipates: (1) prior claims to property and resources and (2) 
states which do not recognize the United States’ pseudo proper-
ty rights regime.149 
Regarding the existence of prior claims, Dinkin argues that 
because “there is no proven enforcement mechanism for prior 
claims, they are unlikely to deter investment if a new strong 
property rights regime were established.”150 Indeed there are a 
number of groups who have staked claims to property on the 
Moon and other planets, but Dinkin is right that there is not, 
at present, a mechanism to enforce, or even legitimize, such 
claims.151 
                                                                                                             
 147. Outer Space Treaty Hearings, supra note 44, at 74. 
 148. Dinkin, supra note 137. 
 149. See id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. “The Lunar Embassy Corporation” has claimed ownership of the Moon 
and several other planets. On their legal basis for doing so, their website 
states: 
  Well, in 1980, a very bright, young and handsome Mr. Dennis 
Hope, went to his local US Governmental Office for claim registries, 
the San Francisco County Seat, and made a claim for the entire lu-
nar surface, as well as the surface of all the other eight planets of 
our solar system and their moons (except Earth and the sun). Obvi-
ously, he was at first taken for a crackpot, until, 3 supervisors, 2 
Floors and 5 hours later, the main supervisor accepted, and regis-
tered his claim. 
  Now, even if you get the claim registered, you are definitely not 
out of the woods yet. You must inform others. For example, at the 
same time, the Lunar Embassy was obliged to inform the General 
Assembly of the United Nations, and the Russian Government in 
writing of the claim and the legal intent to sell extraterrestrial prop-
erties. Now we’re still not out of the woods. The US government has 
several years to contest such a claim. They never did. Neither did 
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The more onerous problem is non-recognition by other states, 
or worse, similar but unconnected foreign regimes. For exam-
ple, one can imagine China developing a parallel regime but 
refusing to coordinate it with the United States’, such that 
property rights to the same celestial property are granted to 
both a Chinese entity and a U.S. entity. In response, Dinkin 
makes a clever argument using the Outer Space Treaty.152 Ar-
ticle IX of the Outer Space Treaty states that: 
                                                                                                             
the United Nations nor the Russian Government. This allowed Mr. 
Hope to take the next step and copyright his work with the US Cop-
yright registry office. So, with his claim and Copyright Registration 
Certificate from the US Government in hand, Mr. Hope became what 
is probably the largest landowner on the planet today. This is the le-
gal basis by which the Lunar Embassy is selling extraterrestrial 
properties. 
The Frequently Asked Questions List, LUNAR EMBASSY, 
http://lunarembassy.com (select “World Headquarters U.S.A.” under the 
“Please choose your country” dropdown next to “English;” then select “Gen-
eral FAQ” appearing under “News & FAQs”) (last visited Dec. 24, 2012). For 
a full description of their legal basis, see Question #2 “What is the Lunar 
Embassy’s legal basis for selling extraterrestrial properties?” on their FAQ 
page. But see Who Really Owns The Moon?, LUNAR REGISTRY, 
http://www.lunarregistry.com/info/embassy.shtml (last visited Dec. 24, 2012), 
for a competing view. This site states in relevant part: 
  These claims are, sadly, false. No single person owns the Moon, 
regardless of whether that person sent a letter to the President of 
the United States or the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
And just because the U.S. or U.N. never responded to this person’s 
letter, that does not mean that he automatically became the owner of 
the Moon and the other planets. Check with any attorney and they’ll 
confirm for you that this isn’t the way the law works in any country 
on Earth. 
  In fact, Dennis Hope of the Lunar Embassy has fabricated a fic-
tional tale in which a vision came to him, and led him to register a 
claim to owning the Moon in 1980. He claims to have filed a docu-
ment with “his local US Governmental Office for claim registries,” an 
entity that simply does not exist. To this date, Hope has not been 
able to produce the original document that he purports to have regis-
tered; instead, he offers a poorly-worded page that he made up on his 
home computer several years after the fact. 
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 152. See Dinkin, supra note 137. 
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A State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe that 
an activity or experiment planned by another State Party in 
outer space . . . would cause potentially harmful interference 
with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer 
space . . . may request consultation concerning the activity or 
experiment.153 
Accordingly, whichever entity reached the property first 
could utilize Article IX. There are several problems, however, 
with Dinkin’s reliance on this Article. A “consultation,” and 
nothing more, will likely provide little protection. Dinkin 
agrees that the “consultation” process would not be as “omi-
nous” as a WTO or North American Free Trade Agreement 
(“NAFTA”) complaint, but concludes that “it is something.”154 
Further, it is uncertain whether the commercial use of property 
under a pseudo property rights regime would constitute “activi-
ties in a peaceful exploration and use” under Article IX. “Use,” 
as discussed previously, has been interpreted to mean non-
exclusive exploitation, which by its very nature excludes pri-
vate commercialization.155 This problem would come down to 
interpretation, which is contentious. Dinkin’s ultimate solution 
to this problem is to “hope that the US” works with other 
space-faring states to sign coordinated, bilateral agreements 
effectuating the pseudo property rights.156 
Another problem concerns the valuations of property in outer 
space. If a resource is discovered on Mars, for instance, and 
several U.S. entities possess the capacity to process the raw 
resource and turn a profit, the allocation of exclusive rights will 
be contentious. According to Dinkin’s regime, a U.S. agency 
would hold hearings and eventually auction the property 
rights. But prior to arrival, which is when the auction would 
                                                                                                             
 153. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. IX. 
 154. Dinkin, supra note 137 (emphasis added). 
 155. Compare Trimble, supra note 9, at 530 (“The word ‘use’ has been inter-
preted to mean ‘exploitation’ on a non-exclusive basis.”), with Sankey, supra 
note 52, at 69 (“[One scholar] has claimed that the right of ‘use’ referred to in 
[the Outer Space Treaty] implies a kind of narrow property right. Under this 
interpretation, for example, a private body would have a legal right to the 
land under a lunar base as long as the base is in use. . . . [I]t seems like there 
is sufficient scope of interpretation to mount an argument for at least narrow 
property rights in the context of the Outer Space Treaty.”). 
 156. Dinkin, supra note 137. 
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occur given that an entity would not invest in unless it had ex-
clusive rights, a multitude of variables exist. Consider such 
variables as quantity, quality (in terms of purity of minerals or 
liquids), and the cost of harvesting or mining the materials 
from the celestial body’s surface. These variable costs will be 
difficult to predict until entities actually arrive on the celestial 
body and start harvesting or mining.157 The large amount of 
variability would make the process similar to buying a lottery 
ticket—you can predict expected returns to a certain extent, 
but it is largely a gamble. This example embodies the general 
problem that “[t]ransaction costs are likely to be high, at least 
where rights holders are widely dispersed and the value of 
rights is subject to a great deal of imprecision.”158 
One final problem remains. When entities are forced to bid 
against one another, the costs will rise. It is questionable 
whether the market will function “perfectly” such that the win-
ning entity can still make enough profit to incentivize actually 
competing. 
[T]he winning bidder would be forced to expend vast re-
sources in compensating the losers . . . [which is] clearly an 
inefficient cost from the perspective of space resource im-
provement . . . [because] valuable resources would still be 
wasted in the purchase of the land . . . that could have been 
channeled more efficiently into reaching or developing the 
planet.159 
A looming question for Dinkin is how his proposal and its 
purported legality under the Outer Space Treaty mesh with 
interpretations of the Outer Space Treaty that require benefit-
sharing. Perhaps the auction price could be put towards the 
satisfaction of this requirement—although, given the discus-
sion above, this is unlikely. The sharing of profits is equally 
unlikely given the requirement to pay an auction price upfront. 
If it is decided that profits must be shared, it will likely, as it 
                                                                                                             
 157. Consider an example: “If, for instance, space minerals are discovered 
that were not known at the time rights were initially allocated, it may be 
practically difficult for a company that is well-positioned to take advantage of 
the new mineral to locate and bargain with all rights holders whose permis-
sion must be obtained.” Merges & Reynolds, supra note 122, at 116. 
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 159. Collins, supra note 4, at 213–14. 
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does now, continue to disincentivize commercialization. Even if 
the United States refuses to abide by this requirement—if it is 
so interpreted by an authoritative body, like the ICJ—doing so 
would constitute a breach, which would likely give rise to the 
United States’ withdrawal. The same uncertainty that gives 
rise to the anticommons problem is ever present in Dinkin’s 
proposal: even a unilateral decision by the United States to 
grant pseudo property rights would be susceptible to uncertain-
ties in terms of legality and international comity under the 
Outer Space Treaty, keeping in mind that if the United States 
withdrew, it would not be able to avail itself of any of the Arti-
cle IX anti-interference safeguards. 
E. Multilateral International Auctions (True Property Rights) 
Evan Sankey has proposed a similar regime to Dinkin’s. San-
key proposes that we withdraw from the Outer Space Treaty 
(or amend it to allow property rights) and have an internation-
al body auction off real property rights.160 Sankey argues that 
all extraterrestrial “property would first come under the juris-
diction of an international regime.”161 Then, “[l]ike the [Federal 
Communications Commission], this international regime could 
then auction property rights . . . to the highest bidder.”162 And 
under economic theory, the rights would end up in the hands of 
those entities who value them most. “This efficient allocation of 
clear and transferable property rights would . . . provide a 
much clearer incentive for companies which wish to develop 
and exploit resources on other celestial bodies to secure funding 
to do so.”163 
An initial question is whether Sankey envisions the amend-
ments to the Outer Space Treaty to remove all sentiments of 
the common heritage of mankind principle and the prohibition 
on territorial sovereignty. It seems implicit enough that to add 
                                                                                                             
 160. See Sankey, supra note 52, at 70 (“One option would be to amend the 
Outer Space Treaty to allow for the auction of extraterrestrial property 
rights.”). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 71. 
 163. Id. Sankey also argues that this system would “eliminate problems of 
congestion in orbit by assigning a value to the scarce geosynchronous orbit 
space” which would eliminate the tragedy of the commons plaguing the 
reachable space resources (as discussed in Part I.A.). Id. 
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real property rights, the prohibition on national appropriation 
of property rights must be removed. But whether some portion 
of the benefit must be allocated to all states is unclear. Due to 
the lack of discussion, it might be safe to assume that Sankey 
envisions a complete overhaul of the Outer Space Treaty. If 
not, many of the same concerns addressed in the analysis of 
Dinkin’s regime above will plague this proposal—although it 
seems likely that withdrawing from the Outer Space Treaty is 
not necessarily a bad thing for Sankey.164 
This proposal will face the same problems as Dinkin’s. Enti-
ties must expend resources compensating the losers, and must 
attempt to value property with huge variable costs, which will 
give rise to high transaction costs. But there is a new twist to 
the transaction costs here. While the costs of unilateral domes-
tic auctions would likely be high due to the problems associated 
with the valuation, international auctions on the scale envi-
sioned by Sankey would give rise to increased and even new 
transaction costs that may be prohibitive of investment in the 
first place.165 
First, the multiplicity of participants on an international fo-
rum would dwarf those of a domestic auction. As stated above, 
“[t]he more parties involved, the higher the transaction 
costs.”166 However, in an auction, the additional players in the 
market process add liquidity and improve the quality and accu-
racy of the prices. And the bidders do not typically interact 
with each other. These factors mitigate transaction costs in the 
traditional sense. But still, managing the enormous number of 
participants and facilitating the process will give rise to bu-
reaucratic costs, which will need to be accounted for. As one 
author writes, “[the auction method] has been rejected as inef-
ficient because of the immense bureaucracy that would be 
needed to conduct auctions.”167 
                                                                                                             
 164. See id. (“[F]or ventures as large, expensive, and inherently uncertain 
as the first commercial forays to the Moon are likely to be, it is imperative 
that the legal environment be as accommodative as possible.”). 
 165. See Collins, supra note 4, at 213 (“[The auction method] has been re-
jected as inefficient because of the immense bureaucracy that would be need-
ed to conduct auctions.”). 
 166. KRIER, supra note 12, at 365. 
 167. Collins, supra note 4, at 213. 
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Second, the introduction of governments will add an entirely 
new cost. “In short, politics will enter the picture. When this 
happens, the efficient auction mechanism could be transformed 
into a bureaucratic monster.”168 It is all but certain that states 
will be heavily involved in the bidding process, given the huge 
potential competitive advantage that accompanies ownership of 
terrestrial property. The addition of multiple international par-
ticipants and their politically motivated governments make the 
transaction costs unique to the international auction proposal 
arguably less palatable than Dinkin’s.169 Indeed, the entities 
and states would not only have to pay off the losers of the auc-
tion, but spend money on the process, potentially prohibiting 
investment in the first place. 
F. Non-sovereign First Possession (res nullius humanitatus) 
The final two proposals grant property rights to entities 
based upon their time of possession, often called “first posses-
sion” regimes. Under a first possession regime, property rights 
are granted to entities by virtue of their rank-in-time of posses-
sion.170 That is, whoever satisfies the requirements of “posses-
sion” (whatever they are determined to be) first is granted 
ownership.171 This rule is also called the “Rule of Capture” and 
it is “[t]he most fundamental rule for determining ownership” 
in American property law.172 This rule has been applied to wild 
animals, land, surface water, and oil and gas reserves under-
ground.173 The first proposal, in this section, argues for a modi-
fied version of the traditional first possession regime that could 
exist under the Outer Space Treaty regime. The second pro-
                                                                                                             
 168. Merges & Reynolds, supra note 122, at 118 (“In the international arena 
where space issues arise, great potential exists for bureaucratic night-
mares.”). 
 169. Indeed several scholars support, as does this Article, a form of first 
possession property rights over international auctions, as will be discussed in 
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 171. See id. See also KRIER, supra note 12, at 2. 
 172. KRIER, supra note 12, at 2. 
 173. See id. at 2–13. 
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posal, discussed in the next section, advocates for a pure first 
possession regime in which the current treaty structure is 
abandoned. 
The Non-sovereign First Possession proposal argues that ce-
lestial bodies should be classified as res nullius humanitatus.174 
Res nullius is the antithesis of res communis—meaning, in Lat-
in, a “thing” (res) “for no one” (nullius). The addition of human-
itatus, or “humanity,” would classify celestial territory as “a 
place where people can still have individual property rights 
and be rewarded for their labor based on first possession, but 
where settlers will act on behalf of the interests of humanity 
rather than a single terrestrial nation.”175 The key is that, ra-
ther than claiming the property on behalf of a single state, it 
would be claimed “on behalf of all mankind.”176 The author, 
Brandon Gruner, argues that “res nullius humanitatus would 
guarantee all humans equal access to the rewards offered by 
outer space, rather than a de facto equal share in the rewards 
reaped from such exploration and exploitation simply because 
they are human.”177 
The first question is whether equal access alone will satisfy 
the Outer Space Treaty’s requirement of benefit-sharing. 
Gruner’s proposal requires that settlers “act on behalf of the 
interests of humanity.”178 Yet he claims that his system would 
“not reject the concept of individual property rights that re-
wards governments and persons for their efforts”179 and that 
there would be no “de facto equal share in the rewards.”180 It is 
clear that private entities (or privatized government entities) 
would be the sole beneficiaries of their immediate tangible 
gains of property ownership—that is, profits from resources or 
manufacturing. The “interests of humanity” that are being 
served by this regime, however, are not clear. “[E]qual access to 
the rewards offered by outer space” is the only thing which 
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Gruner cites that might benefit the international community. 
This equal access is clearly insufficient to satisfy non-space-
faring states, as they have strongly opposed any regimes other 
than those employing the common heritage of mankind. Grun-
er’s interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty—that states do 
not have to share the profits of outer space—is also extremely 
contentious as it is, and because we know that non-space-faring 
states will almost certainly reject the claim that “equal access 
to the rewards” satisfies the treaty’s requirement, it is uncer-
tain why Gruner is concerned with staying within the bounds 
of the treaty at all. 
The second, and more practical, issue is who actually owns 
the property. Property rights are rights against others, and if 
individual states cannot obtain territorial sovereignty, they 
cannot grant these rights, save for a Dinkin-esque pseudo 
property regime. Gruner proposes the establishment of an in-
ternational regime to create and enforce this non-sovereign 
first possession legal system.181 It is not entirely clear, howev-
er, how ownership would work. If ownership is governed by the 
regime itself, the laws and regulations would need to be ex-
tremely comprehensive if they are to be the exclusive and com-
plete body of law on outer space.182 This would give rise to 
enormous transaction costs, and would arguably be impossible. 
Such a utopian regime would require the agreement of every 
state on Earth, or at the least the U.N., which we can assume 
would be extremely difficult. The question then becomes why 
Gruner bothers with the addition of “humanitatus” to “res nul-
lius.” Claiming property on behalf of the “interests of humani-
ty” without giving any tangible benefits to humanity—because 
individuals reap all the benefit of their property—will not only 
fail to satisfy non-space-faring states and the Outer Space 
Treaty, but will necessitate the creation of a new legal regime 
with enormous transaction costs. 
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G. Sovereign First Possession (pure res nullius) 
A group of scholars propose a pure first possession regime for 
the allocation of property rights in outer space, which would 
require abandonment of the Outer Space Treaty. First, Jona-
than Thomas argues for a free-market first possession re-
gime.183 The key to Thomas’s regime is state sponsorship, or 
“chartering.” Under this system, a space-faring entity would be 
granted a charter from a state that would “allow the grantee to 
claim land in the name of the grantor state and entitle the 
grantee to certain contractual benefits and obligations pursu-
ant to the provisions of the charter.”184 The entity would, once 
granted a charter, act “on behalf of” the sovereign state to 
claim territory, which the entity would then own by virtue of 
rights granted from the charter state. 
With charter in hand, each entity would be required to fulfill 
three steps: discovery, claim, and possession. Discovery would 
“require that the discoverer ambulate and physically stake a 
claim upon the extraterrestrial region because ambulation en-
tails significant labor and peril.”185 The claim requirement is 
simple enough: “[t]he state should put the rest of the world on 
notice that the state believes it owns the property.”186 And the 
possession requirement would perfect title to the property.187 
Effective possession requires the sovereign to secure its posi-
tion and continually perform symbolic acts to indicate its le-
gitimate authority over the territory. . . . These acts could in-
clude enacting municipal laws, appointing administrators, 
levying taxes, providing civil dispute resolution, providing 
protection from hostile forces, excluding non-citizens, and 
other exercises of police, administrative, and judicial authori-
ty.188 
Soon after Thomas published his proposal, John Adolph re-
sponded with the addition of several elements.189 Adolph sup-
ports the “discovery, claim, and possession” system, but would 
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require the establishment of an international regulatory agen-
cy to monitor and regulate activities in outer space.190 Adolph 
fears that the fate of outer space would mirror that of pre-
twentieth century property rights concepts of terra nullius 
(“territory of no one,” similar to res nullius191) which were 
plagued by “[a]rmed conflict, environmental devastation, and a 
lack of regard for the rights of other nations.”192 Accordingly, 
Adolph would have the international agency perform three 
functions. First, it would allow for non-space-faring states to 
participate as observers or non-consultative parties, similar to 
the ATS structure, until they actively began to support space 
research.193 Second, it would protect the space environment 
through regulations to “ensure that one [entity’s] activities do 
not prevent others from enjoying the same benefits of space.”194 
Third, it would manage conflict—particularly by establishing 
“explicit rules for how sovereignty” is established, presumably 
through Thomas’ “discovery, claim, and possession system.”195 
Along similar lines, Robert Merges and Glenn Reynolds have 
proposed a modified first possession and deed registry re-
gime.196 Merges and Reynolds argue that possession must be 
defined narrowly enough to prevent over claiming and must 
use technology to “coordinate with a ‘deed registry’ on Earth, so 
that the positions of boundaries could be confirmed remotely 
from the registry office.”197 They also suggest setting aside two 
types of preserved areas. The first, “development preserves,” 
would be set aside for developing states to give them “a greater 
stake in peaceful space development.”198 The second would be 
for environmental research and conservation purposes.199 
Merges and Reynolds suggest that these areas constitute 10-
15% of the area capable of commercial development.200 
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These proposals have merit. While each plan contemplates an 
abandonment of the common heritage of mankind principle, 
each anticipates providing a voice, and in Merges and Reyn-
olds’ case, actual preserves, to non-space-faring states. Setting 
aside area for environmental protection is also agreeable. 
Adolph’s conflict concern is well taken, and indeed a system 
similar to the WTO or NAFTA structures—inter-organization 
arbitrations with the possibility of ICJ referrals—might be effi-
cient. 
First possession regimes do, however, suffer from a theoreti-
cal defect. The problem is that “the first nation to land on [a 
celestial body, and effectively obtain title,] is not necessarily 
the one that will use the [celestial body’s] land in the most pro-
ductive way.”201 The result is too-rapid development in the 
technologies required to obtain title, which results in entities 
obtaining title without the necessary technology to efficiently 
commercialize the property.202 From the analysis above, we 
know that the alternative—international auctions—would give 
rise to prohibitive transaction costs; so this requires the United 
States to make a choice between the lesser of two evils. The 
choice becomes clearer when we examine some of the positive 
externalities that accompany a first possession race to the 
property. As discussed above, an externality “is a cost (or bene-
fit) of any given action that is not taken into consideration by 
the actor.”203 This gives rise to the classic tragedy of the com-
mons problem. But here, with a race to the property induced by 
a first possession regime, there are positive externalities (bene-
fits) that are non-existent in an international auction pro-
cess.204 
“[I]nefficient races to claim and develop space resources will 
come with a significant spillover benefit: the development of 
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more rapid and more diverse space exploration vehicles.”205 
Other innovations such as “food synthesis or alternative energy 
sources, could lead to the improvement of the standards of liv-
ing for people on Earth.”206 “In much the same way that society 
encourages technical progress through what might be described 
as ‘racing for patents,’ on the belief that the spillovers to socie-
ty exceed the costs of racing, it should consider encouraging a 
race ever deeper into space.”207 Indeed, the space race of the 
1950s and 1960s did exactly this.208 Still, the problem of ineffi-
cient use could be mitigated further. 
These authors have provided what I would call the second 
step of an ideal property rights regime for outer space. First 
possession rights would relieve the tragedy of the anticommons 
problem by allowing space-faring entities to retain the full re-
turn of their investments. But a practical problem is that, 
while enumerating specific elements necessary to “take posses-
sion” is reasonable—enacting municipal laws, levying taxes, 
policing inhabitants, providing civil dispute resolution—the 
satisfaction of those elements in the near-future is unlikely 
given the proposed uses of celestial property and our current 
technological capabilities. The initial uses of celestial proper-
ty—mining and manufacturing, for example—can be done with 
few astronauts and mostly machines. These types of missions 
would be unable to satisfy the possession requirements as set 
forth in Thomas’s and Adolph’s proposals. However, it is also 
true that these mining missions should not convey title to the 
property for lack of establishing true possession. 
A regime is needed in which entities can commercialize outer 
space at lower operating levels than would satisfy “possession,” 
with effective protection of their rights, and effective regulation 
of their activities, and a regime in which true territorial sover-
eignty is available upon the satisfaction of certain factors simi-
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lar to the possession requirements. In this way, we can incen-
tivize investment (avoiding a tragedy of the anticommons), 
avoid overconsumption (avoiding a tragedy of the commons), 
regulate activities (avoiding inefficient use and environmental 
damage), and allow entities and states to do so without having 
to establish the onerous possession requirements in order to 
obtain any property rights. The first possession advocates pro-
vide the second step; what is needed is a first step. Such a two-
tiered property rights regime, combining many of the positive 
aspects of the proposals studied in this Article, is proposed be-
low. 
III. THE PROPOSED TWO-TIER PROPERTY RIGHTS REGIME 
A. Tier One: Non-Sovereign First Possession 
The first tier is a system of non-sovereign first possession. 
Entities would be able to obtain property rights to areas of ce-
lestial bodies and the orbits upon which they operate, much 
like Dinkin’s Pseudo Property Rights and White’s Functional 
Property Rights. An International Regulatory Body (“IRB”) 
would be established to serve two purposes: (1) to provide prop-
erty rights to and between entities and (2) to regulate their ac-
tivity. The IRB would be less comprehensive than other pro-
posals’ international regimes because the IRB would not estab-
lish a comprehensive new legal regime. The IRB regime would 
be much simpler. It would establish basic rights to property 
exercisable against other entities and regulate human activity 
in outer space. Importantly, entities would be governed by the 
laws of their states of origin and international law, but only to 
the extent that those laws are not preempted by IRB regula-
tions—much like U.S. federal/state preemption. Because the 
IRB only regulates activity between humans (and their enti-
ties), it would only have jurisdiction over humans and their ac-
tivity while in space. To be clear, the IRB would not claim own-
ership over the entire universe. All of outer space would be 
classified as res nullius. 
This would be the first tier; the IRB would only preemptively 
regulate activity up to the point that the activity satisfies the 
criteria for territorial sovereignty, discussed in the next sec-
tion, at which point the state (or the state of origin of the space-
faring entity) would obtain sovereignty and fall out of the pur-
view of the IRB. 
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The IRB could be run like an arm of the U.N. Its composition 
could be similar to the ATS or the U.N. Security Council. The 
IRB could be made up of permanent members who are space-
faring and a smaller number of rotating members who are non-
space-faring—collectively these members would make up an 
“IRB Council.” 
For the IRB’s first function, granting property rights, the IRB 
would use a pure first possession rule to allow entities entering 
space to operate on celestial bodies. These operations would not 
convey title. They would only allow the entity to exclusively op-
erate (mine, drill, manufacture, etc.) and retain any returns 
(profits, resources, goods, etc.). True ownership rights would 
only be granted in the returns—that is, what an entity “cap-
tures” or creates is theirs. Disputes over who should get what 
part of a celestial body would be decided by first possession—
the entity which gets there first and starts mining obtains ex-
clusive rights against others to the area on which it operates—
granted by the IRB. To be clear, an entity could have exclusive 
operating rights only over the area on which it is actually oper-
ating (with specific definitions to be determined by the IRB 
Council). This system would prohibit giant unsubstantiated 
claims to celestial bodies. 
There are a number of problems that could arise under this 
system, which necessitates the IRB’s second function.209 When 
entities do not own the property they are less likely to use it in 
its most efficient or sustainable way. Entities would be incen-
tivized to use the property in whatever way would be the most 
profitable at that time—the “race to the property” problem de-
scribed above. This use of property—maximizing short-term 
gains at the expense of sustainability—is problematic from 
both an efficiency and environmental standpoint. The IRB’s 
second function, then, would be to serve as the custodian of 
outer space res nullius property. 
The IRB Council would set regulations on the use of celestial 
property. Activities which would severely damage or pollute the 
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property would be prohibited. Inefficient uses would be regu-
lated to incentivize efficient ones. The IRB could levy fines or 
fees for failures to meet these standards. Admittedly, not all 
inefficient or destructive uses would be predictable, but any 
protection is good protection. 
The IRB could also play to the concerns of developing states 
and environmentalists. In line with the Adolph and Merges and 
Reynolds proposals, this regime could establish scientific re-
serves for exploration and study, as well as portions of usable 
land for developing states. These preserves could be estab-
lished by the IRB from areas not in use by space-faring enti-
ties. Indeed, these reserves would diminish available resources, 
but would likely not be prohibitive if limited to an amount less 
than 10%, as compared, for instance, to the 50% requirements 
of UNCLOS. This is especially true where none of the returns 
are required to be distributed to other states. 
In terms of procedure, an entity would need to apply for a use 
permit prior to launch. The IRB would approve the permit pro-
vided that it met all of the regulatory standards. The entity 
would then be entitled to operate as set forth in the permit. 
The entity’s rights to specific resources and territory located in 
the permit area would be granted to the entity upon their suc-
cessful arrival and operation thereupon. Using similar ele-
ments from proposals above, the operations facilities would be 
entitled to some EEZ to enable safe and efficient movement. 
When the operations ended or fell below a certain level, the en-
tity will be said to have abandoned its temporary, non-
sovereign claim to the area and it will lose its IRB-granted 
rights against other entities. Funding for the IRB could come 
from application fees or taxes paid by space-faring entities. 
These would only fund the IRB’s operational costs. At this 
stage, disputes could be sent to the IRB Council or a dispute 
resolution body made up of IRB Council members. Interactions 
between entities would be governed as they are between enti-
ties in the High Seas or Antarctica. 
To reiterate, this first tier would not require the IRB to estab-
lish a comprehensive legal regime, but simply to create a body 
of regulations on which to judge proposed permits, regulate 
use, and grant exclusive rights against others. This first tier is 
necessary because (1) non-sovereign first possession regimes 
can give rise to inefficient and damaging uses of property and 
(2) the initial uses of space are unlikely to satisfy the posses-
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sion requirements for territorial sovereignty. However, at some 
point, the establishment of those possession requirements may 
become a possibility. 
B. Tier Two: Sovereign Possession upon the Establishment of 
Modified Statehood Factors 
The second tier is a system of sovereign possession in which 
territorial sovereignty (i.e., national appropriation) would be 
available upon the satisfaction of certain modified statehood 
factors. To obtain territorial sovereignty, an entity, operating 
as an extension of the state of its origin, would need to mani-
fest its intent to own title of the land through acts similar to 
those proposed by Thomas and Adolph for possession. Once ter-
ritorial sovereignty is obtained by an entity’s state of origin, 
the entity would be free to operate in any way it liked subject 
only to the domestic laws of its state and international law. 
Prior to that point, entities could mine, harvest, drill, manufac-
ture, and operate so long as they act in accordance with the 
regulations of IRB. While under IRB regulation, there would be 
one of two ending options: (a) the property is abandoned and 
the entity loses its IRB rights against others or (b) the property 
comes under the territorial sovereignty of a state. To reempha-
size, the race to the property problem is mitigated first by the 
IRB regulations, and second, in the event that it comes under 
the ownership of a state, it would, by virtue of the factors, be 
used efficiently. 
To determine the elements which a state must satisfy 
through its entity’s activities, we can turn to existing interna-
tional law. How we classify these extraterrestrial territories 
will inform the elements. The requirements needed for a terri-
tory to be recognized as a “state” with international personality 
are a good place to start. 
On Earth, “[t]he generally accepted criteria for statehood is 
that the entity has to demonstrate that it has (a) a permanent 
population; (b) defined territory; (c) a government; and (d) ca-
pacity to enter into relations with other States.”210 The extent 
to which we should employ each of these traditional factors 
should be dependent upon the classification of outer space ter-
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ritory—are these entities starting brand new states or colonies? 
Colonies, or “overseas territories,” are those territories which 
come “under the sovereignty of a State (‘parent State’), but 
which [are] not governed as part of its metropolitan territo-
ry.”211 The U.N. Charter describes overseas territories as non-
self-governing.212 In colonies, the parent state decides the ex-
tent, if any, to which the colony has control over such things as 
internal affairs, defense, and foreign relations.213 This “colony” 
or “overseas territory” classification fits our scenario more ac-
curately than a classification as a brand new state. Using the 
colony classification, the traditional statehood requirements of 
“government” and “capacity to enter into relations with other 
states” will necessarily be satisfied, leaving “a permanent 
population”214 and “defined territory.” Yet, because we are not 
dealing with the creation of a new state, but instead with the 
establishment of a colony on res nullius, we should also look to 
how international law handles states’ acquisition of terra nul-
lius. 
On Earth, “[t]erra nullius can be acquired by any State (but, 
unless acting on behalf of a State, not by a private person or 
company) which has the intention to claim sovereignty and oc-
cupies the territory by exercising effective and continued con-
trol.”215 The operative elements are (1) intent and (2) effective 
and continued control. In the Island of Palmas arbitration, it 
was held that the continuous and peaceful display of territorial 
sovereignty, manifested in different ways depending on the 
time and place, was as good as title.216 “The arbitrator stated 
the display of sovereignty should be open and public . . . .”217 
“Open” and “public” are vague terms and are subject to the as-
pects of each individual situation. If we were to implement 
                                                                                                             
 211. Id. at 29. 
 212. See U.N. Charter arts. 79, 81. 
 213. See AUST, supra note 38, at 30. 
 214. The establishment of a permanent population is, at present, practically 
impossible. However, the use of a permanent population (1) can be justified to 
a certain extent and (2) is accompanied by some powerful and critical incen-
tives. The use of this factor is discussed below. 
 215. AUST, supra note 38, at 37–38. 
 216. See ELINA STEINERTE & REBECCA M. M. WALLACE, NUTCASES: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 91–92 (2008). 
 217. Id. at 92. 
572 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 38:2 
solely the terra nullius acquisition requirements, entities oper-
ating under the first tier could be said to have obtained title to 
the property. This would allow for a state to claim territorial 
sovereignty without manifesting a true intent to establish a 
colony. The problem with this outcome is that it would allow 
states to bypass the IRB regulations. When states manifest a 
true intent to remain, that is, a true intent to take ownership 
of, sustain, and develop the property, they are less likely to al-
low it to be devastated by overconsumption and environmental 
damage or to use it inefficiently—the things that plague non-
sovereign first possession. 
If we combine the remaining elements of statehood with 
those required to acquire terra nullius, we have: (a) a perma-
nent population, (b) defined territory, (c) intent to claim sover-
eignty, and (d) effective and continued control, with the caveat 
that such control be peaceful, open, and public. 
Retaining the permanent population factor from the tradi-
tional statehood factors appears on its face to be problematic. 
Because, at present, establishing permanent populations on 
celestial bodies is practically impossible, this factor has the po-
tential to hold states back more than any other. Making it all 
but impossible in the immediate future for states to establish 
territorial sovereignty could cause an anticommons problem in 
the first tier, as will be discussed Part III.C.3. However, a per-
manent population is a powerful measure of a state’s vested 
interest in territory. A state is less likely to act in a way that is 
damaging or wasteful of territory when it has a permanent 
population there—this is the benefit of using it as a factor. Do-
ing so, however, is a policy choice. Should states be allowed ter-
ritorial sovereignty without establishing a permanent popula-
tion? As discussed, a permanent population is not required to 
bring terra nullius under the territorial sovereignty of a state; 
but space is different. Human mobility to and from celestial 
territories is far more difficult and costly than mobility from 
state to state on Earth, and this investment of resources can 
serve as (1) a manifestation of a state’s long-term, sovereign 
interest in the territory and (2) a powerful incentive to use the 
territory in way that is efficient and sustainable—more so than 
mere ambulation. 
Certainly, a medium between Thomas’s and Adolf’s ambula-
tion and the permanent population statehood factor might exist 
to bridge the gap—for example, sustained ambulation or the 
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establishment of permanent bases capable of long-term human 
habitation. And in terms of efficient and sustainable use, more 
strict and comprehensive international regulations on the uses 
of outer space could mitigate the problem. But whether we 
should enable states to obtain territorial sovereignty over celes-
tial territory without first establishing a permanent population 
remains a policy question. Normatively, states will act most 
consistently with efficient use and conservation when they 
have vested interests in the territory for the long-term, which, 
arguably, is manifested most directly through the establish-
ment of a permanent population. 
With the permanent population factor, again, we have: (a) a 
permanent population, (b) defined territory, (c) intent to claim 
sovereignty, and (d) effective and continued control. These ele-
ments combine the requirements of the discovery, claim, and 
possession system proposed by Thomas and Adolph. The dis-
covery element is satisfied through the more onerous require-
ment of (a) a permanent population, as opposed to ambulation 
alone. The claim element is satisfied through (c) intent to claim 
sovereignty. And possession is encompassed more broadly in (d) 
effective and continued control. Element (b) defined territory, 
as discussed above, is included both to encourage clear demar-
cation and to narrow the scope of territory claimed—in con-
junction with (d)—in accordance with Merges and Reynolds’s 
suggestion. Thomas’s list of possession manifestations could be 
used as examples of ways to manifest a state’s effective and 
continued control of a defined territory: “enacting municipal 
laws, appointing administrators, levying taxes, providing civil 
dispute resolution, providing protection from hostile forces, ex-
cluding non-citizens, and other exercises of police, administra-
tive, and judicial authority.”218 
The final arbiter of statehood (i.e., whether a state has satis-
fied the factors) should be left to an international body, like, for 
instance the ICJ or even the IRB Council.219 Once title is ob-
tained, the territory would be free of IRB regulation and would 
be subject only to the parent state’s laws and international law. 
An entirely new international legal regime to govern the con-
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duct of colonies is unnecessary—current international law can 
provide ample precedent. 
Consider, for example, the Trail Smelter arbitration between 
the United States and Canada. In 1986, a smelter was started 
near Trail, British Columbia.220 The smelter produced, as a by-
product, mass quantities of sulfur dioxide, which it released 
into the air. This sulfur dioxide caused damage in the state of 
Washington in the United States.221 The arbitral tribunal held 
that “no state had the right to use or permit the use of its terri-
tory in such a manner so as to cause injury by fumes to the ter-
ritory of another, or to the properties or to persons within that 
territory.”222 Indeed, the ICJ or another system of international 
courts could be established to handle the disputes between col-
onies—which would likely arise early and involve property dis-
putes of the Trail Smelter and Island of Palmas flavor—using 
existing international law. Trail Smelter is only one example of 
many that can provide ample precedent.223 
The tragedy of the anticommons can be avoided by opening 
up outer space to commercialization. However, a pure first pos-
session regime may have the alternative effect of a tragedy of 
the commons. A two-tiered system can achieve, arguably, a 
happy medium. Tier one will allow entities to commercialize 
outer space at low levels of operation. The IRB will grant enti-
ties property rights against others and enable them to retain 
their return on investment. The IRB will also serve as the cus-
todian of the res nullius territory, regulating its use and setting 
aside preserves for study and use by developing states. If an 
entity’s use, in conjunction with its parent state, satisfies the 
modified statehood factors—(a) a permanent population, (b) 
defined territory, (c) intent to claim sovereignty, and (d) effec-
tive and continued control—the parent state would be able to 
establish territorial sovereignty over the property. Upon acqui-
sition of territorial sovereignty, the colony would leave the ju-
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risdiction of the IRB and be run solely by the parent state and 
relevant international law. 
C. Drawbacks and Assumptions 
Several problems which exist in other proposals exist here, 
but to mitigated extents. The race to the property problem is, 
as described above, mitigated by the positive externalities of 
the race and the regulations of the IRB. The transaction costs 
of the IRB still exist, but to a lesser extent than a new compre-
hensive legal regime or an international auction regime. But 
here there are some different assumptions and new potential 
problems. 
1. Costs of the IRB 
In this proposal, I have assumed that fees and taxes on 
space-faring entities would fund the IRB. This is a big assump-
tion. In 2010, the ISA adopted a $13 million budget for its 
2011-2012 operations.224 These funds came from the U.N.’s 
regular budget, which, incidentally, is another potential avenue 
for funding. The ISA also requires dues from UNCLOS member 
states, which may be yet another option for financing. On the 
other end of the spectrum, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Of-
fice (“USPTO”) 2011 budget was just over $2 billion.225 The 
USPTO vets patents as they are requested, which is similar to 
the vetting the IRB would do to commercial proposals. The cost 
of the IRB would need to be explored in more detail. 
2. The Creation of New States 
One question left unanswered is whether private entities 
could establish entirely new states.226 As discussed, generally 
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terra nullius cannot be claimed by new states. But the tradi-
tional statehood factors are used to establish international 
recognition of new states.227 This proposal does not contemplate 
the creation of new states. Of course, it is possible, and even 
likely, in the long-term future. This proposal could be modified 
to allow for the creation of new states upon the establishment 
of all traditional statehood factors. The current international 
laws on statehood and recognition could be used in outer space 
as they are on Earth. This would likely occur through seces-
sion, given the ease of initially gaining territorial sovereignty 
as a colony.228 
3. Uncertainty in the Second Tier 
One potential problem is the uncertainty of the second tier. If 
the modified statehood factors are vague or uncertain, or if 
states fear that they are too onerous, the factors may induce an 
anticommons problem in the first tier. This problem can be 
avoided with realistic and clear requirements—like Thomas 
and Adolf’s examples. The IRB Council would be responsible 
for enumerating the specifics. As technologies develop and uses 
become clearer, it would be important for the IRB Council to 
revisit the specific requirements of each modified statehood fac-
tor, or even the factors themselves, if, for instance, a perma-
nent population is determined to be too onerous. One possibil-
ity is to allow entities to apply for milestone certificates from 
the IRB Council which would certify and legally acknowledge 
certain milestones met by the entity as it approached satisfac-
tion of the statehood factors. These milestone certificates could 
be renewable and could serve as evidence supporting a deter-
mination of sovereign possession. In any case, the second tier 
must have sufficient regulatory certainty so as to avoid an an-
ticommons problem in the first tier. 
4. The Illegitimacy of the Common Heritage of Mankind 
Finally, this theory assumes that the common heritage of 
mankind principle is illegitimate. This principle is the primary 
catalyst of the anticommons problem. Its premise, that all 
states are due an equal share of outer space, is largely unsub-
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stantiated. Perhaps, by virtue of states’ proximity, its use on 
Earth is justified for the purposes of ensuring our peaceful co-
existence.229 But aside this practical point, the sheer absurdity 
of the U.N.’s claim to all of outer space exemplifies its illegiti-
macy.230 On what basis should humanity simply claim owner-
ship of the entire universe? Imagine making contact with intel-
ligent life and attempting to explain how humans own the en-
tire universe, including the planet or system on which they 
live. In fact, this even goes against our traditional notions of 
property ownership. John Locke’s theory of private property 
ownership was that, generally, property belongs to everyone—
arguably all life in the universe—equally until one “admixed 
his labor to it,” at which point it becomes the private property 
of that individual.231 Indeed, Locke’s theory is vindicated 
through the first possession proposals. Common heritage re-
gimes grant everyone equal rights regardless of their labor or 
input of value. There is simply a lack of support for granting 
every state a right to every part of outer space by virtue of its 
existence on Earth. Further, history and economic theory 
prove—by UNCLOS, the ATS, and the Outer Space Treaty—
that such regimes are inefficient. For these reasons, this pro-
posal rejects the legitimacy of the common heritage of mankind 
principle. Even still, this proposal supports the establishment 
of preserves for developing states and for study—not out of a 
belief that it is required, but for environmental protection, sci-
entific research, and to encourage developing states to develop 
space-faring technologies. 
CONCLUSION 
The commercialization of outer space is suffering from a 
tragedy of the anticommons. No state or private entity has 
been willing to bear the cost of commercialization because in-
ternational law prohibits national and, potentially, private ap-
propriation; and even if the laws are interpreted to allow pri-
vate appropriation, they require private entities to share some 
quantity of the returns with all states. Indeed, the diversity of 
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interpretation itself creates such an uncertainty that it is pro-
hibitive of meaningful investment. As discussed, the prohibi-
tion on appropriation is a remnant of the Cold War era, and the 
benefit-sharing requirement is largely unsubstantiated. 
This Article has analyzed nine of the leading proposals for 
property rights regimes aimed at avoiding the tragedy of the 
anticommons. Many of these proposals give rise to new, prohib-
itive inefficiencies and costs, while others result in arbitrary 
results, like Russia being entitled to over 10% of all celestial 
bodies and Israel only 0.01%. Drawing from each potential re-
gime, this Article has proposed a two-tier system wherein enti-
ties could, first, commercialize space, keep their return on in-
vestment, and be regulated to protect against inefficiencies, 
and, second, upon the satisfaction of certain modified statehood 
factors, obtain territorial sovereignty. 
